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Essay
The Logic and Antilogic of Secret Rights
D.H. Kaye*
Students of jurisprudence are a contentious brood. Since
the time of Socrates, they have been challenging one another's
theories of justice. Faced with interminable philosophizing, one
is tempted to dismiss the entire jurisprudential enterprise as a
snare for the clerisy and a delusion for the masses. If centuries
of theorizing have not produced definitive conclusions, then it
may be time to transcend this mode of reasoning-to leap into
hyperspace, as it were. Professor Girardeau Spann, who re-
cently described the hyperspatial perspective on constitutional
law,1 now provides a detailed and multifaceted argument in
support of this move in his essay, Secret Rights.2 In it, he boldly
asserts that all existing theories of individual rights are neces-
sarily unsatisfactory3 and promises a new paradigm that
"reconceives analytical use of language and de-emphasizes ana-
lytical reliance on logic."'4
One of the most intriguing features of Secret Rights is its
reliance on logic to attack logical argument itself. I believe that
this trendy deconstructionist 5 tactic fails. To support my skep-
ticism about Secret Rights, I shall describe selected aspects of
the analysis and indicate its weaknesses. Part I examines
* Professor of Law, Arizona State University. I am grateful to Jeffrie
Murphy, Kevin Saunders, James Weinstein, and Girardeau Spann for their
comments on a draft of this Article.
1. Spann, Book Review, 84 MICH. L. REv. 628 (1986).
2. Spann, Secret Rights, 71 MINN. L. REv. 669 (1987).
3. Spann observes that "[s]ince the seventeenth century, when the con-
cept of rights first came into vogue, philosophers and social theorists have
struggled to articulate an acceptable theory of individual rights, but their ef-
forts remain largely unsatisfactory.... [T]he persistent failure of rights the-
ory suggests that we have done just about all that can be done from within the
analytical paradigm that has governed rational discourse to date." Id. at 669.
4. Id. at 670.
5. See, e.g., C. WINQUIST, EPIPHANIES OF DAPKNESS: DECONSTRUCION IN
THEOLOGY (1986); Balldn, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE
L.J. 743 (1987).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Spann's claim that all extant theories of rights are logically in-
coherent and shows that one can avoid the problems identified
by Spann without abandoning logic. Part II analyzes Spann's
critique of deductive logic as a component of theories about
rights and argues that logic has its uses. Part III discusses
Spann's proposed nonlogical paradigm for handling rights and
questions whether this approach is preferable to a logic-based
analysis. I conclude that while there is far more to political and
legal argument than deductive logic, logic should continue to
play at least a supporting role in theories about rights.
I. ARE RIGHTS INCOHERENT?
As indicated above, Spann attacks nothing less than all ex-
isting theories of individual rights. He comes closest to defining
individual rights when he refers to them as "individual inter-
ests.., beyond the reach of societal abrogation, even when ab-
rogation would serve the collective good."' 6 In other words,
rights trump other kinds of interests.7 In a society that pur-
ports to be governed by majority rule, rights are therefore an-
timajoritarian.8 Spann believes that such antimajoritarian
rights are incoherent,9 presumably because they entail contra-
diction or paradox.
A. THE ANTIMAJORiTARIAN DLEmA
In Spann's view the antimajoritarian dilemma arises be-
cause recognition of a right by the judicial system, as an institu-
tion created by the majority, makes the putative right "simply
an interest endorsed by the majority."'01 As such, "classification
as a right becomes superfluous.""- To escape this dilemma, one
could adopt the familiar theory that the majority does not pre-
fer the specific result of the case but prefers instead a proce-
dure that rejects an outcome-specific preference whenever a
right is at stake.12 Spann maintains that our majoritarian sys-
6. Spann, supra note 2, at 671.
7. While Spann contends that a right is "beyond the reach of juristic
modification," he does not mean that a right is absolute. Spann only requires
"some sort of immunization from societal abrogation." Id. at 671 n.2.
8. Id. at 672. Spann does not limit his analysis to rights in democratic so-
cieties. The antimajoritarian dilemma applies, mutatis mutandis, to any sover-
eign. Id. at 672 n.3.
9. Id. at 672.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Cf. R. SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT AND SOCIAL NORMS 154-55
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tern bars this route. He writes that "as long as the majority
continues to favor the procedure that it has authorized, any
outcome produced by that procedure necessarily corresponds to
the preference of the majority."13
The argument that an apparently antimajoritarian result is
essentially majoritarian rests on an undifferentiated definition
of antimajoitarian.14 If we admit, however, that two types of
majority preferences exist, the dilemma disappears. For in-
stance, we may call the majority view on whether at a particu-
lar time and place the government should ban a given book a
Type I preference. We may also call the majority's unwilling-
ness to overthrow an institutional framework, which precludes
the banning of the same book at the same time and place, a
Type II preference. Some rights theorists would suggest that
when the Type II preference frustrates the Type I preference,
the individual has a meaningful right.15 Thus, Spann's com-
plaint that a right lacks antimajoritarian content16 because it
reflects a Type II rather than a Type I majoritarian preference
hardly establishes that the right "lacks logical coherence." 17
i
(1975) (defending an absolute prohibition against governmental interference
even though such interference may periodically have advantageous conse-
quences); Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955) (demonstrating
the importance of distinguishing between "justifying a practice" and "justify-
ing a particular action falling under it").
13. Spann, supra note 2, at 673.
14. Cf. Wollheim, A Paradox in the Theory of Democracy, in PHILOSOPHY,
PoLrTcs & SocmErY 71, 72 (1962) (identifying concepts of democracy, both an-
cient and modern, as "the rule of the people").
15. Cf. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CH.
L. REV. 1129, 1142 (1986) ("Some rights represent second-order preferences re-
flected in constitutional text.").
16. Spann, supra note 2, at 675.
17. Id. Spann anticipates that some readers may detect in his foregoing
argument "a concept not fully articulated." Id. at 676. Indeed, Spann men-
tions the distinction among preferences upon which I have elaborated. Id. at
676 n.11. Yet Spann does not identify any inconsistency that arises from defin-
ing a right as a Type H preference prevailing over a Type I preference. He
merely asserts that one could attack the Type I-Type II conception of a right
as not resting on "a meaningful difference between first- and second-order
preferences," as precluding natural rights, or as resting on an unjustified ele-
vation of Type II rights. He expresses his faith that if one were to pursue such
an argument, one would always generate a dilemma. Id. Inasmuch as Spann's
argument does not lead to logical inconsistency, Spann's treatment of the an-
timajoritarian quality of rights falls far short of establishing the inevitability
of such a dilemma.
Spann's second tack for addressing the Type I-Type II solution is even less
satisfying. Spann implicitly redefines his thesis. Instead of demonstrating the
unavailability of a coherent theory of rights, he emphasizes "that analytical
manipulations can always be performed once the initial premises have been
1988]
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We may easily escape the antimajoritarian dilemma be-
cause it trades on ambiguity in the term majoritarian. At the
crux of Spann's argument is his insistence that, as a matter of
definition, "the majority prefers to do whatever it does," includ-
ing doing that which it does not prefer to do.' 8 As with any ar-
gument that smacks of troublesome self-reference, 19 we can
solve the dilemma by refining the terminology to prevent the
apparent self-reference. 20 Type I and Type II terminology ac-
complishes precisely that result.21 "Adherence to a rational an-
alytical paradigm"2 2 does not cause Spann's dilemma; an
equivocal use of the term majoritarian does. Consequently, the
specified and locked in." Id. If this means that scholars may constantly refine
terms to permit further argument, he is probably correct. To a great extent,
the history of philosophy is a history of refining the terms and rethinking the
premises of arguments.
18. Id. at 672-73.
19. Not all instances of self-reference are troublesome. Many are simply
amusing. See D. HOFSTADTER, METAMAGICAL THEMAS 5-48 (1985).
20. For a discussion of self-reference in legal argument, see Fletcher,
Paradoxes in Legal Thought, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1263, 1266-67 (1985). As Pro-
fessor Kevin Saunders has pointed out to me, the self-reference (if there is
any) in Spann's antimajoritarian dilemma does not lead to the semantic and
mathematical paradoxes that have been important or intriguing in philosophi-
cal logic. The self-reference in those paradoxes comes from making a state-
ment about the statement itself (for example, "This statement is false.") or
asking of a term whether it has the property denoted by the term (for exam-
ple, "Is heterological heterological?"). See generally RECENT ESSAYS ON
TRUTH AND THE LIAR PARADox (R. Martin ed. 1984). If we ask, "Is it an-
timajoritarian for the majority to respect a(n) (antimajoritian) right?," the an-
swer merely depends on how we use antimajoritarian in each part of the
question.
21. The point can also be made without refining phraseology. One could
compare the antimajoritarian dilemma to the argument that if God is omnipo-
tent, it can limit its own powers, in which case, it is not omnipotent. The fal-
lacy is obvious-a previously omnipotent being can change its status.
Likewise, an executive or administrative officer can bind himself by a regula-
tion that he does not have the power to rescind. See, e.g., United States ex rel
Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 267 (1954) ("[A]s long as the regulations
remain operative, the Attorney General denies himself the right to sidestep
the Board or dictate its decision in any manner."). Similarly, the majority can
agree to institutional arrangements that result in outcomes that would not be
acceptable in a plebiscite but retain the power to change these outcomes by
constitutional amendment or revolution. So too, a majority can adopt a two-
thirds voting rule that produces individual outcomes distasteful to a majority
but that nevertheless commands the support of the majority. To view individ-
ual rights as antimajoritarian in this sense does not present a logical dilemma.
Cf. Wollheim, supra note 14, at 85 (distinguishing between "direct" and "ob-
lique" moral principles and arguing that they are not incompatible even
though they cannot be simultaneously realized).
22. Spann, supra note 2, at 676.
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bold claim that one must step "outside of a rational paradigm"2
to believe in individual rights is unwarranted.
B. THE LIBERAL DILEMMA
Spann presents a class of liberal theories of rights as alter-
native formulations of the antimajoritarian theory of rights.24
These liberal theories, according to Spann, build on a distinc-
tion between policies and principles but "succeed only in pro-
ducing another analytical dilemma."2 5 In a slight variation on
the argument just considered, Spann maintains that a political
procedure (such as a court) cannot apply countermajoritarian
principles because all political procedures (including courts) by
their very nature are majoritarian.
Again, we may respond by distinguishing among political
organs and maintaining that courts are expected to apply prin-
ciples rather than policies in adjudicating claims about rights.
In the alternative we might support one political organ, such as
a parliament, but contend that it is capable of recognizing when
a right (an argument based on principle) should prevail over a
more politically expedient result (a policy argument).
Now we can resolve the putative dilemma by referring to
an argument of policy as a Type I claim and an argument of
principle as a Type II claim. A court or a parliament can recog-
nize Type II claims and give them priority over Type I claims,
not because there is a Type I justification for that result in the
individual instance, but because the court or parliament is com-
mitted to respecting rights.
Once we recognize this distinction, much of Spann's argu-
ment reduces to the concern that in many instances
majoritarian political influences 26 may improperly affect deci-
sions about rights. On this point Spann's reading of the history
of the protection of individual rights is defensible. Throughout
this less than happy history, rights arguably have been more
often honored in the breach. It is quite a jump, however, from
an unpardonable gap between theory and historical practice to
a conclusion that the principle-policy distinction is logically
deficient.
To bridge this gap Spann insists that even a decision maker
who succeeds in deciding on a basis other than momentary ma-
23. Spann, supra note 2, at 676.
24. Id. at 677-80.
25. Id. at 678.
26. I& at 679.
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jority preference nevertheless decides on the basis of personal
preference.27 Such preferences, Spann contends, are political
and "potentially biased considerations of expediency rather
than actual neutral principles." 28 Hence, the liberal theorist is
condemned to a world of preferences that are inherently un-
principled because they cannot be divorced from political
interpretation.29
Once again Spann's argument smacks of definitional fiat.
Spann treats all personal preferences of decision makers as
political, thereby ignoring the possible distinction between a
personal preference to act expediently and a personal prefer-
ence to abide by principles. Spann comes close to recognizing
as much when he considers the counterargument:
[e]ven if all decision making is political in some definitional sense,
there is nevertheless an important difference between the everyday
political expediency used by Congress in deciding whether to grant a
special interest tax exemption, and the more austere type of decision
making engaged in by the Supreme Court when it makes individual
rights determinations. 30
Because he phrases this riposte in terms of judicial protec-
tion of individual rights, Spann says that this counterargument
fails unless one can show that judicial decision making protects
individual liberty more successfully than legislative activity.3 '
As we have seen, however, the critical distinction is not so
much which political organ decides a case as it is whether that
organ relies on Type I or Type II arguments. If a judge follows
the Type II preference, abiding by principles rather than deter-
mining what is momentarily expedient, we may easily say that
the judge is respecting a right-based claim. Of course, in prac-
tice, a judge may dress a Type I decision in the garb of a Type
II decision. Recognizing this possibility, however, does not ad-
vance the analysis beyond the writings of the early realists.
The oft-debated question of whether requiring Type II justifica-
tions actually constrains decision making and advances the
cause of individual liberties is still unanswered. 32
27. Spann, supra note 2 at 680.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 680 n.15.
31. Spann asserts that congressional decision making may be more protec-
tive of individual liberty than Supreme Court decision making. Id. at 681 n.15.
32. See generally Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A
Critical Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986) (discussing a reasoning
process through which a hypothetical case involving a conflict between law
and a judge's personal beliefs may be resolved).
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In sum, Spann has simply proven that if all decisions are
labelled political, a puzzle arises over whether decisions to ad-
here to principle are actually based on policy. Because we can
easily avoid the ambiguity, and hence the semblance of self-
reference, the dilemma is unconvincing. As a practical matter,
the liberal rhetoric of rights may be merely emotive, but this
argument against liberalism reveals no logical dilemma.
C. THE NEGATIVE RIGHTS DILEMMA
Spann defines negative rights theories as those that "seek
to promote individual liberty by defining a private sphere of au-
tonomy and self-determination. '33 He finds this contradictory
because "[w]henever the government protects one individual's
autonomy from intrusion by another, the government is inter-
fering with the autonomy of the second individual."'
This complaint confuses a private sphere of autonomy with
unbounded autonomy. Few people would claim that individuals
have a right to do whatever they want. Total autonomy on the
part of selfish individuals would produce irreconcilable con-
flicts. Thus, any plausible theory must distinguish the private,
protected sphere from the public, unprotected sphere. The only
analytical dilemma related to negative rights theories35 comes
from speaking of autonomy without differentiating between the
private and public spheres.
Nonetheless, Spann rejects the possibility of distinguishing
between permissible and impermissible failures of government
to preserve autonomy.3 6 Essentially repeating the arguments
already considered in the previous two sections, Spann reasons
that a political institution would have to interpret any principle
defining a private sphere of autonomy that is immune from
governmental interference. Having already concluded that all
decisions of political organs are political rather than principled,
Spann sees the same dilemma in negative rights theories that
he advanced against liberal theories.
Spann's argument is equally weak in this context. Indeed,
Spann seems to attribute to negative rights theorists the view
33. Spann, supra note 2, at 681.
34. Id. at 682.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 682-83. I would restate this distinction as the distinction be-
tween the private, protected sphere and the public, unprotected sphere. Then
we may say that negative rights theory must demarcate these spheres. In
those terms I understand Spann's argument to be that one cannot identify the
private sphere in a principled way.
1988]
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that every interference with total autonomy is equally serious.
Spann suggests that negative rights theories cannot differenti-
ate between a claim that one has the right to burn children
alive for sadistic pleasure and the claim that one has the right
to read Joyce's Ulysses in one's own home.
Yet negative rights theories can and do make such distinc-
tions without becoming internally inconsistent. Consider the
classic negative rights principle that denies to the government
any legitimate power to prevent an individual from acting as
long as the action does not engender harm to others. Adher-
ence to this principle can produce countermajoritarian results
in specific instances. It also establishes a private sphere of au-
tonomy-I can do what I want as long as my actions do not
harm any one else-which interferes with no one else's parallel
sphere. Everyone else, likewise, may do what he or she wants
as long as it does not harm another person.
Of course the harm-to-others principle has its shortcom-
ings. Difficulties become apparent as one moves from the ca-
nonical case of physical harms (such as burning children) to
merely offensive behaviors (such as public fornication), to risks
of harms, and so on. Contemporary political philosophers have
striven mightily to clarify or supplement the harm-to-others
principle in order that it might produce reasonable results.37
Their efforts may not have been crowned with complete suc-
cess, 38 but there is nothing logically wrong with their attempts
or the underlying principle.
Inasmuch as Spann fails to mention the modern harm-to-
others literature, which purports to delineate a defensible scope
of inviolable interests (and could thus answer his queries about
speed limits, heroin laws, and Sunday closing laws),39 his claim
that all negative rights theories have failed seems premature or
rash. Still less substantiated is his sweeping claim that "any ef-
fort to rehabilitate a theory of negative rights is doomed to fail-
ure because no analytically acceptable distinction between
public and private spheres of interest exists. °4 0 The sole reason
for this nonexistence thesis is that "the private sphere simply
has no meaning independent of that given it by the public
37. See, e.g., 1 J. FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE
CRnIINAL LAw (1984); 2 J. FEINBERG, OFFENSE TO OTHERS: THE MORAL LIM-
ITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAw (1985).
38. See, e.g., Dalton, Book Review, 96 YALE L.J. 881 (1987).
39. Spann, supra note 2, at 683.
40. Id.
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sphere. '41 This may be solid, deconstructionist rhetoric, but it
ignores the analytically acceptable distinction, advanced in the
previous two sections, between Type I and Type II social prefer-
ences. Institutions that enforce Type II preferences may keep
the spheres separate.
D. THE CoMMuNIY RIGHTS DmEMMA
Societal rights theories give greater priority to community
well-being than to individual interests. Because only individu-
als can interpret and apply community rights, Spann finds that
"some version of each dilemma that arose in the context of in-
dividual rights... reappear[s] in the context of communitarian
rights."' 2 In particular, he contends that a variant of the an-
timajoritarian dilemma arises because "no communitarian right
could secure recognition unless an individual were willing to
honor it."'43 He maintains that the public-private dilemma ap-
pears because "the sphere of collective interests comprising a
communitarian right cannot be defined in any way that an indi-
vidual decision maker does not ultimately determine."'
I have said perhaps more than necessary to indicate why I
find that these arguments fall short of demonstrating "a dis-
tinction between the individual and society... destined to lack
analytical coherence."45  Spann's treatment of terms like
majoritarian, political, and public is redolent of the gravy
served at Woolworth's-it covers everything. While no rights
theory has universal support, the claim that all of them are log-
ically incoherent rests on putative errors of self-reference or
circularity46 that one can avoid within the context of customary
rational analysis.
41. Spann, supra note 2, at 684. This aspect of Spann's argument does not
amount to an effort to undermine a theory of rights with a paradox of self-
reference. His argument is simply that negative rights theories are circular.
Private is defined as the absence of public, and public as the absence of pri-
vate. I am indebted again to Professor Kevin Saunders for reminding me that
there is nothing illogical about defining a term as the negation of its negation.
Arguments involving such circular definitions may not take us out of the start-
ing gate, but they are neither contradictory nor paradoxical, and they do not
impeach deductive logic itself.
42. Id. at 685.
43. Id at 687.
44. Id. at 686.
45. Id. at 688.
46. Id.
1988] LOGIC
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II. IS RATIONAL ANALYSIS WRONG?
Spann concludes that, because his treatment of rights theo-
ries leads to counterintuitive results, the culprit is rational
analysis.47 He insists that "the rules of the governing para-
digm" permit his analysis.48
If each dilemma arises from the use of an ambiguous term
that suffocates crucial distinctions, Spann errs in presuming
that he has provided impeccable logical arguments.49 Rather
than unearth fundamental flaws in logical theory, he steps into
pitfalls that logicians normally avoid.50
It is unclear, however, whether Spann actually is claiming
that he properly proved that a logical flaw inheres in rights
theories. At one point he characterizes his argument about
rights quite differently. He states: "[I]t is always possible to
generate counterintuitive conclusions without violating any of
the rules of rational analysis .... [The only thing wrong with
what I have done is that it leads to conclusions that are intui-
47. Spann, supra note 2, at 688.
48. Id.
49. Spann believes that his analytical dilemmas result from self-reference,
as in the Liar paradox, in which Epimenides the Cretan asserts that all
Cretans are liars. Id. at 692. This reliance on classic paradoxes of self-refer-
ence seems misplaced. See supra note 20. Spann confuses the vice of circular-
ity with the paradox of self-reference. Compare Spann, supra note 2, at 692
("Good can be defined as the absence of evil .... The terms ... become not
only mutually supporting but self-referential .... .") with supra note 41 (distin-
guishing circularity from self-reference).
Furthermore, even if Spann has identified a true paradox of self-refer-
ence in political argument, his discovery would not impeach formal logic.
Scholars have used the self-referential argument that Spann considers impec-
cable to show that set theory is incoherent. The Russell Paradox about the
class of all classes that are not members of themselves made this point. E.
NAGEL & J. NEWMAN, GODEL'S PROOF 24 (1958); B. RUSSELL, INTRODUCTION TO
MATHEMATIcAL PHILOSOPHY 181-93 (1967). With his theory of types, however,
Russell successfully avoided the paradoxes of set theory. The lesson here is
not that formal logic is wrong, but that a certain class of arguments is inadmis-
sible in any valid analysis that assigns definite truth values to all the proposi-
tions in a formal language.
50. As indicated, supra note 41, circularity is not a defect in logic. We
even can explain the self-reference in the Liar Paradox without rejecting
logic. See, e.g., C. LEWIS & C. LANGFORD, SYMBOLIC LOGIC 438-85 (2d ed. 1959).
I do not suggest that there is presently a fully adequate theory of truth that
enables us to identify the pernicious instances of self-reference. We have in-
formal methods, however, for identifying the troublesome cases and once they
are identified we can remove their sting. Cf. G. HARMOI , CHANGE IN VIEW:
PRINcIPLES OF REAsONING 87 (1986) (discussing the value of self-referential
beliefs).
[Vol. 72:603
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tively unacceptable."5 1-
Because formal logic permits us to be certain of the validity
of arguments, including counterintuitive ones, this modification
of what appeared to be the original thesis is hardly an indict-
ment of logic or a justification for some other kind of reason-
ing. Spann defines rational analysis as "the application of
logical rules to valid initial premises."'52 I conclude that
Spann's complaint lies not with logic itself but with premises of
a logical argument that are subtly false and, when unrecog-
nized, produce false conclusions. As he states, "Our intuitions
cannot properly be relied upon to help distinguish between the
manipulated conclusions and the arguably genuine ones. '53
Thus, his modified thesis has two parts: garbage in produces
garbage out, and the incoming garbage is nearly impossible to
spot in arguments about rights. Because we cannot smell the
garbage with language and logic, Spann suggests that we use
some other mode of analysis.
This modified thesis requires elaboration and defense. Are
we unable, even in theory, to root out false premises? Are co-
herence theories that ask us to reconcile our intuitions about
specific results with the general principles to which we purport
to subscribe theoretically inadequate? 4 Or is the argument
more pragmatic: because people's opinions differ on these mat-
ters, no practical way exists to measure the better argument
concerning rights? Will the alternative mode of discourse that
Spann advocates produce more consensus or more correct re-
sults? And, regardless of one's responses to these questions,
would not logic retain a role in revealing the consequences of
accepting a statement as true or rejecting it as false?
By and large Spann does not answer these questions. In-
stead, he launches a more elaborate assault on deductive logic
as a component in the analysis of rights. In the course of this
discussion he rejects coherence theories as illicit "peeking
ahead,"55 stating that a new paradigm would work better.56
51. Spann, supra note 2, at 688.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 688-89.
54. The use of reflective equilibrium, for example, is prominent in moral
and political philosophy. See, e.g., J. RAWIS, A THEORY OF JusTicE 48-51
(1971). Logicians also may rely on reflective equilibrium analysis to justify the
very rules of logic. See G. HARMAN, supra note 50, at 9; Resnik, Logic: Norma-
tive or Descriptive? The Ethics of Belief or a Branch of Psychology, 52 PHIL.
SCI. 221 (1985).
55. Spann, supra note 2, at 697.
56. Spann also discusses the limitations of natural language. Id. at 689-94.
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Spann limits his criticism to deductive, first order logic.57
He initially complains that this logic does not work with prem-
ises whose truth values can never be determined5 and that
"demonstrating the metaphysical truth of a premise describing
a social phenomenon would be difficult."5 9 While noticeably
not criticizing deductive logic itself, Spann realizes that the
rules of deductive logic do not assign truth values to premises.
If taken at his word, Spann's skepticism concerning the
value of deductive argument about rights would be unwar-
ranted. I interpret his assertion about "difficulty" to be tanta-
mount to the stronger claim that establishing the truth of
premises describing social phenomena is impossible because
Spann's most skeptical conclusions presuppose impossibility
rather than difficulty. Furthermore, I doubt that Spann in-
tends to characterize descriptive propositions about social phe-
nomena as indeterminate. Consider a sentence S, which reads,
"In the United States, exactly 4281 people live in traditional
families." S describes a social phenomenon, and S is false. Ad-
mittedly, the words people, living, and traditional families con-
tain some ambiguity, but I am confident that I could clarify
such terminology sufficiently that most would agree that S has
an exceedingly high probability of falsity. Now, to make infer-
ences involving S as a premise, I need an inductive logic.60
Because I am particularly interested in his criticism of logic, I shall offer only
a few comments on his discussion of language. Spann points out the ambiguity
of natural language, stressing that the linguistic map is not itself the territory.
Nevertheless, Spann does not rest here. He further criticizes natural language
as a vehicle for analyzing rights because self-referential terms present a "po-
tential problem." Id. at 693. He also suggests that the concept of rights is inef-
fable, stating that it "simply refuses to be confined by any linguistic
formulation." Id. Consequently, a conclusion expressed in expository lan-
guage may be too artificial, and the meaning of words may change in subtle
ways in the course of an argument. Id. at 693-94.
What conclusions should be drawn from these observations is less than
clear. When language is ambiguous, we should reject arguments that depend
on equivocation. Similarly, the solution to any occasional problem of self-
reference is not a paradigm shift but the use of better terminology if a paradox
surfaces. If we encounter ineffable concepts, we should say as much as we can
while admitting that we cannot tell the whole story. Expository prose that de-
scribes color to a congenitally blind person or pregnancy to a man cannot de-
pict the experience accurately or completely, but it is not necessarily
worthless.
57. Id. at 695 n.48.
58. Id. at 695.
59. Id.
60. An argument is deductively valid if and only if it is impossible that its
conclusion is false given that its premises are true. B. SKYRMS, CHOICE AND
CHANCE: AN INTRODUCTION TO INDUCTIVE LOGIC 7 (2d ed. 1975). An argu-
[Vol. 72:603
While Spann contends, without any basis or apparent reason,
that inductive logic is less useful than deductive logic for estab-
lishing the truth of propositions like S about society,6 ' his real
target must be normative propositions like the claim that all
people are entitled to equal protection of the laws.6 2 Such pro-
positions are not empirical, making it unclear what it means to
say that such a proposition has a given probability of being true.
As far as I can tell, Spann only questions the use of deduc-
tive logic with normative, as opposed to descriptive, proposi-
tions. If so, in expressing his concern for metaphysical truth he
merely restates the classic problem of objectivity in ethics.
Even assuming, as Spann seems to, that no objective procedure
for discerning the truthfulness of ethical premises exists, it
does not follow that deductive logic is useless. Spann recog-
nizes, after all, that deduction permits us to establish the truth
of conditional propositions. For example, let R stand for the
right not to incriminate oneself, let x stand for any person, and
let n stand for the person named Oliver Nort. The sentence
C, which may be written as (x)Rx -+ Rn, or less formally as "If
all people have the right not to incriminate themselves, then
Oliver North has a right not to incriminate himself," is true.
As Spann explains, "As long as the analysis complies with the
logical rules, any conclusion generated by the analysis should
be acceptable at least to those who agree with the premises."' 3
Spann implies that knowing whether conditional sentences
like C are true does not aid philosophical or legal discourse
about rights. He complains that "[ifn the context of most social
problems, the act of ascribing a truth value to a premise-de-
ciding whether or not the premise is acceptable-replaces
rather than facilitates logical analysis."' ' Perhaps this is an
empirical claim, but why it should be true is obscure. In the
end I think that it restates his concern with the ambiguity of
natural language. 5 Because we do not really know what R is,
Spann suggests, we cannot use statements like (x)R to derive
C. If we do not share a core understanding of the property R,
ment is inductively strong if and only if it is improbable that the conclusion is
false while the premises are true. Id. A deductive logic suited to probabilistic
claims also can be devised. See Saunders, A Logic for the Analysis of Collat-
eral Estoppel, 12 RUTGERs COMPUTER & TECH. L. REv. 99 (1986).
61. Spann, supra note 2, at 695 n.48.
62. Id. at 696.
63. Id. at 695.
64. Id. at 696.
65. See supra note 56.
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sentences like C, while formally correct, tell us nothing about
rights.66 Yet, the view that no canonical case of compulsory
self-incrimination can be constructed strikes me as extreme
and untenable skepticism about the language of rights.
Even more troubling is the observation that "[p]eeking
ahead to see how a premise will be used before taking a posi-
tion on its acceptability ... overrides the logical analysis. ''67
This claim ignores the usefulness of indirect proof in mathe-
matics. For instance, Euclid established that no largest prime
number exists by proving that the assumption of a largest
prime number leads to a contradiction. We are forced to reject
the premise as false by examining its consequences. Such rea-
soning, which involves peeking ahead, does not defeat "the
whole purpose of conducting a logical analysis" even though
"[the conclusion has generated the premise. '68 More gener-
ally, logic serves a purpose even if one starts with the conclu-
sion. By determining initially what premises establish the
conclusion, one can turn to moral, legal, or other extralogical
discussion of less complex ideas about which persons are more
likely to agree or, at least, to recognize the core of their
disagreement. 69
In partial reply Spann might concede that logic requires us
to brand as false a premise that generates a contradiction, while
asserting that we would be cheating to reject a premise that
leads to merely counterintuitive conclusions. It takes consider-
able ingenuity, however, to argue that one may peek ahead
when making mathematical deductions but not legal or philo-
sophical deductions. The problem with peeking ahead cannot
be self-evident, considering that several respected philosophers
have introduced coherence theories as devices for adjusting
premises and conclusions. Examining unexpected conclusions
that logically flow from attractive premises seems like a reason-
able way to test our intuitions about both the premises and the
conclusions. Perhaps we will accept what first appeared to be a
counterintuitive conclusion if the premises remain attractive. In
other words, we will modify our intuitions about the conclu-
sions. Alternatively, our intuitions about the conclusions may
compel us to modify or reject the premises. This process of ad-
66. But see Kress, The Interpretive Turn, 97 ETHICS 834, 855-59 (1987)
(describing theories of meaning).
67. Spann, supra note 2, at 697.
68. Id. at 697.
69. Professor Kevin Saunders called my attention to this fact, in language
quite close to that which I have used.
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justing and accommodating our intuitions abodt both premises
and conclusions will not resolve all controversies, but neither is
it illogical.
Spann may, of course, believe that the acceptance of tenta-
tive and modifiable intuitions is a sham. Indeed, he claims that
"[t]he system has been closed before the analysis even begins,
thereby ensuring the desired result. ' 70 But this is a complaint
about human psychology rather than an indictment of deduc-
tive logic. Spann's argument will not convince anyone who
does not already subscribe to the same belief.71
In addition to his claim that deductive logic fails to improve
the discussion of rights, Spann asserts that it may be affirma-
70. Spann, supra note 2, at 697.
71. He merely asserts that "we have not developed an epistemological
model-a paradigm-in which such a form of argument is explicitly cogniza-
ble." Id. at 698 n.57. Apparently, the substantial body of writing in moral phi-
losophy that explicitly indulges in discussion about the priority of various
intuitions does not present cognizable argument.
Neither is Spann's reference to Gidel's theorem very revealing. While
Spann wisely recognizes that "it is probably not useful to attempt a direct ap-
plication of Gidel's theorem to legal or philosophical analysis," id. at 699 n.58,
he thinks that "[o]ne of the implications of GMdel's theorem is that logic" does
not constitute "a closed system in which things happen in a predictable way, in
accordance with orderly rules that are understandable and reliable." Id. This
is not what the theorem states or implies. The orderly rules of an axiomatized
system do not cease to work. A theorem that is correctly proven within such a
system is not subject to doubt by reason of G6del's discovery. See, e.g.,
R. JEFFREY, FORMAL LOGIC: ITS SCOPE AND LIMrTs 185 (2d ed. 1981). As for
predictability, even an extremely simple system, to which G6del's theorem
does not pertain, can produce unexpected results. See W. POUNDSTONE, THE
REcuRsrvE UNIVERSE: COsMIc COMPLEXrrY AND THE LIM=TS OF ScIENTIFIc
KNOWLEDGE 13-32 (1985).
Gbdel's proof does demonstrate that there are arithmetic truths that can-
not be proved within a strictly formal system. Yet, even these truths can be-
come known to mathematicians:
Gddel's proof should not be construed as an invitation to despair or as
an excuse for mystery-mongering. The discovery... does not mean
that there are truths which are forever incapable of becoming known,
or that a "mystic" intuition (radically different in kind and authority
from what is generally operative in intellectual advances) must re-
place cogent proof. It does not mean... that there are "ineluctable
limits to human reason." It does mean that the resources of the
human intellect have not been, and cannot be, fully formalized, and
that new principles of demonstration forever await invention and dis-
covery. We have seen that mathematical propositions which cannot
be established by formal deduction from a given set of axioms may,
nevertheless, be established by "informal" meta-mathematical reason-
ing. It would be irresponsible to claim that these formally indemon-
strable truths established by meta-mathematical arguments are based
on nothing better than bare appeals to intuition.
E. NAGEL & J. NEwmAN, supra note 49, at 101.
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tively counterproductive. 72 This thesis rests on three weak
legs. To the extent that Secret Rights convinces us that falla-
cious deductive arguments often seduce people, it does not give
us any reason for a paradigm shift. It only gives us a reason to
look at legal rhetoric with care.73 To the extent that Secret
Rights stresses that logic induces us to think in dichotomous
terms and to effect a binary reduction that conveys "an over-
simplified version of the social world in which we live,"74 it
errs.75 To the extent that Secret Rights contends that logic "di-
lutes the incentive.., to imagine new, more satisfying forms of
conceptualization, ' 76 it must identify a superior mode of
thought. Let us turn, then, to the new paradigm that Spann
espouses.
III. THE NEW PARADIGM
A. ScIENTIFIc REVOLUTIONS
Spann finds in the increasing number of books and essays
like Secret Rights77 an indication that the legal world may be in
the midst of a paradigm shift in rational analysis.78 The notion
of a paradigm emerged from Thomas Kuhn's studies of the his-
tory of science.79 By and large the paradigms that Kuhn identi-
72. Spann, supra note 2, at 699.
73. Theories about rights do not purport to offer causal or psychological
explanations for why we fine or imprison people. These theories explain why
we are justified in our actions. Reliance on legal rules or principles by way of
justification "perpetuates a distorted account of why we do the things that we
do to each other," id. at 699, only if one fails to distinguish between the inter-
nal and external aspects of a legal system.
74. Id. at 700.
75. See infra text accompanying notes 104-07.
76. Spann, supra note 2, at 700.
77. Id. at 703.
78. Id.
79. T. KUHN, THE STRuCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REvOLUTIONS (1962). In his
writings Kuhn uses the term paradigm in two senses. A paradigm-as-achieve-
ment is the accepted way of solving a problem, serving as a model for future
researchers. A paradigm-as-a-set-of-shared-values encompasses the methods,
standards, and generalizations shared by those trained to carry on the work.
SCIENTIFIC REvoLuTioNs 2-3 (I. Hacking ed. 1981). As one might expect, phi-
losophers of science have challenged Kuhn's use of paradigms on which Spann
builds. One of the more caustic critics, Paul Feyerabend, writes:
Kuhn's ideas are interesting but, alas, they are much too vague to give
rise to anything but lots of hot air. If you don't believe me, look at
the literature. Never before has the literature on the philosophy of
science been invaded by so many creeps and incompetents.... We do
not get interesting false ideas, we get boring ideas or words connected
with no ideas at all.
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fied in physics and related sciences rely heavily on deductive
logic and mathematics. To this extent "the rules of the analyti-
cal game"8 0 have never changed.
Viewing this conservatism as blindness to new ways of
looking at the universe, Spann treats all paradigms as equally
effective in explaining how we reach conclusions. "If we had
another organizing system," he writes, "it would work just as
well as our rational organizing system does because it would
have to."81 Reducing all theory to convention seems bizarre
when applied to scientific paradigms. The Copernican view of
the universe is superior to the Ptolemaic even though both can
predict the same observations of planetary motions. Newton's
laws of motion work better than Aristotle's. A scientific realist
or pragmatist would surely disagree with Spann's observation
that "[o]ur logic-based system of rationality is neither natural
nor compelled by any need to correspond to objective reality. '8 2
If we are witnessing a revolution in legal theory that will over-
throw the present paradigm of rational analysis,8 3 the paradigm
shift is far more revolutionary than previous shifts, drawing
only metaphorical support from those that have occurred in the
scientific world.84
Feyerabend, How to Defend Society Against Science, in ScIENTIFIC REVOLU-
TIONS, supra, at 160.
80. Spann, supra note 2, at 701.
81. Id. at 702.
82. Id. at 701. The same point may be made in regard to everyday, practi-
cal reasoning. Although imperfect, the correspondence between formal logic
and pragmatic reasoning schemas is more than coincidence or convention. J.
HOLLAND, K. HOLYOAK, R. NISBETr & P. THAGARD, INDUCrION: PROCESSES OF
INFERENCE, LEARNING AND DISCOVERY 44-45, 255-86 (1986).
83. I fully agree with Spann that alternatives to inductive and deductive
logic such as Zen Buddhism exist. To produce a credible argument for this
kind of paradigm shift in science, however, Spann must establish that these al-
ternatives have greater explanatory power than contemporary scientific reli-
ance on logic.
84. Spann uses quantum theory as an example of how our culture relies
heavily on nonlogical organizing systems. Spann, supra note 2, at 702. Quan-
tum mechanics is not nonlogical. Quantum mechanics is full of deductions
from assumedly true premises. Rather than eschew deductive logic, quantum
mechanics employs it. Rather than undermining mathematical logic, the
Heisenberg uncertainty principle reflects a mathematical property of the posi-
tion and momentum operators. See, e.g., E. MERZBACHER, QuANTuM MECHAN-
ICS 156 (1961). In this, as in other instances, quantum mechanics uses different
mathematical representations of physical systems than does classical mechan-
ics, but it does not reject the logico-deductive schema in favor of some "nonra-
tional conceptualization." Spann, supra note 2, at 702. To understand the
behavior of elementary particles like photons, physicists no longer believe, in
the spirit of Democritus, that particles are tiny, immutable billiard balls. In
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B. MODERNISM IN GENERAL
Fortunately, these allusions to scientific revolutions are not
central to the analysis in Secret Rights. The more important is-
sue is whether the nonrational system which Spann favors for
political discourse has greater efficacy than the established
mode of political and legal argument. His source of inspiration
is "[post-structuralist, modernist schools of thought that have
influenced theology and the humanities."8 5 "Modernism," he
reports, "is a term that can be used to convey the belief that
fundamental, structural assumptions are proper subjects for
scrutiny and reexamination."8 6 This belief is not itself a new
paradigm. "[S]kepticism about religious authority, biblical doc-
trine and about the historical accuracy of theological events"8 7
does not substitute nonrational conceptualization for deductive
and inductive logic. In the humanities, modernism which refers
to "such works as nonrepresentational painting, atonal music,
and stream of consciousness literature"'88 may seem less com-
patible with logical reasoning. Nevertheless, this catalog does
not explain how "modernism offers the promise of a qualitative
advancement in analytical thought"8 9 about rights.
The only modernist insights about rights that Spann makes
explicit are the arguments about equivocal terms, circular defi-
nitions, and self-reference.9 0 Subject to the criticisms outlined
in Part I, these arguments do nothing to establish the existence
or reveal the contents of rights.91
C. LEGAL MODERNISM
Like his treatment of scientific revolutions, Spann's de-
scription of modernist tenets is but a prologue to a more con-
crete description of the new paradigm. As opposed to
expository writing, literary language should be privileged be-
quantum field theory, the fields are the fundamental units and the particles
are merely manifestations of these fields. While this conception of matter is
far removed from everyday experience and produces profound difficulties in
understanding causation in traditional terms, it is not, as Spann seems to
think, "replete with... logical impossibilities." Id.
85. Spann, supra note 2, at 703.
86. Id. at 704.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 705-07.
91. Spann views this as an advantage. He states that "[b]oth theoretical
and practical discussions of rights completely depend on perceptions concern-
ing those rights rather than any actual content of the rights." Id. at 706.
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cause of its "greater capacity to capture and convey, ineffable
concepts." 92 Literary language, according to Spann, provides a
"direct evocation of potentially complex concepts." 93 Although
a well-written short story or poem can evoke an emotional re-
sponse or capture the nuances of a particular situation, it is
hard to see how this quality of literature helps us analyze "so-
cial phenomena that are now being constructed to correspond
to our current perceptions about social reality."94 Descriptions
of social reality are one thing; normative claims about social ar-
rangements are another. A novel may depict a social phenome-
non like corruption with great insight, it may spur reform, and
so on, but is it the type of writing to which attorneys and legal
academics should aspire? Would such writers know good from
bad, right from wrong, without recourse to deductive, norma-
tive reasoning? Could we more confidently rely on this new
wave of literary briefs than on the tired, old analytical ones?
A concrete example of literary language's use in the new
paradigm would help to dissipate the mystery. Spann identifies
the Supreme Court's opinion in American Textile Manufactur-
ers' Institute v. Donovan95 as illustrative of our present ten-
dency to "carry our penchant for precise expository definition
to ridiculous extremes. ' 96 In Spann's eyes Justice Brennan
"pretended that a profoundly difficult social issue, the proper
manner of regulating exposure to toxic substances when the ef-
fects of given exposure levels is uncertain, could be resolved by
reliance on the dictionary definition of a statutory term. '97 Jus-
tice Brennan, of course, pretended no such thing,98 but how
92. Spann, supra note 2, at 707.
93. Id. at 710.
94. Id.
95. 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
96. Spann, supra note 2, at 708.
97. Id. at 708 n.81.
98. The textile manufacturers challenged OSHA's cotton dust standard.
American Textile, 452 U.S. at 494. OSHA contended that the pertinent statute
required the most stringent standard that was technologically and economi-
cally feasible. Id. at 495. The Court stated the issue to be "whether the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act requires the Secretary in promulgating a
standard... to determine that costs of the standard bear a reasonable relation
to its benefits." Id. at 506. After examining the language, structure, and legis-
lative history of the Act, the Court held that the statutory phrase "to the ex-
tent feasible" did not require OSHA to equate marginal benefits to marginal
costs when setting standards. Id. at 512-13. Justice Stewart dissented on the
ground that, without any evidence of the total cost of the standard, there was
not substantial evidence to support the agency's determination that its stan-
dard was economically feasible. Id. at 543.
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would a modernist construe the statute? By devising a Dicken-
sian novel about laborers in the industrial revolution? What in-
effable concept should the Court have addressed? The pain and
anguish of victims of byssinosis or the pleasures of cotton
dungarees?
Spann offers the tale of Robin Hood as an example of the
superiority of modernist legal analysis. In the new paradigm,
"we would just tell the jury the story and allow Robin's claim
of right to resonate on the same intuitive level at which the op-
erative rule of decision resides."99 If this is all that is required,
the new paradigm looks like unbridled intuitionism, and story-
telling to the jury seems similar to the technique that good liti-
gators use now. Perhaps Spann's proposal differs because it
contains no rules of relevance (because explicit legal liability
rules would only impede intuitive decision making) so that
Robin could tell his story better. More significantly, Spann
may be arguing for a new logic that modulates the resonances
of intuitions, producing correct outcomes.
In addition to the reliance on literary language then, the
new paradigm involves a reconceived concept of logic that has a
more formal role for intuitions.100 Presumably, this new logic
will supply the literary lawyers with more valid intuitions than
are presently available. This leads us again to the suggestion
that we create more formal or well-defined theories to treat in-
tuitions about premises and conclusions. Spann only can say in
explanation of his suggestion that "the precise model of how
the two will interact is presently unclear."101 The mystery
continues.
Spann, nevertheless, asserts that the reconceived system of
logic will improve upon deductive logic with its presently ex-
cluded intuitions.10 2 Yet in existing normative and empirical
argument we may, and usually do, inquire into the plausibility
of an argument's premises. Because the rules of a particular
formal logic only tell us how to transform one set of symbols
into another, they do not help us in this inquiry. But neither
do they preclude us from consulting our intuitions about prem-
ises, transformation rules, or conclusions. The choice is not be-
tween a new way of reasoning, of "which we are as yet unable
to conceive," and an "obsolete" system "that tries to exclude in-
99. Spann, supra note 2, at 716.
100. Id. at 712.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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tuition altogether."'' 03 A more rigorous procedure for dealing
with intuitions would be welcome, but in this regard Spann
proselytizes for an improved epistemology, not a better proposi-
tional calculus. In calling for new logic rather than improved
moral epistemology, Secret Rights may point in the wrong
direction.
Spann also wants the new logic to contain "the ability to
account for a broader range of interactions between conceptual
ideas."'1 4 He reiterates the view that "binary reductionism en-
tails too great a loss of descriptive accuracy."'1 5 This objection
indicates that Spann misunderstands the power of deductive
logic to handle multivalued functions. At various points Spann
asserts that social phenomena are beyond the reach of binary
logic because they are multidimensional. 106 Spann seems to de-
fine multidimensional as multivalued; he alludes to properties
or quantities that cannot be described with yes or no proposi-
tions. Consider the measurement of an object's temperature. If
binary logic restricted us to yes-no measurements of tempera-
ture, major branches of chemistry and physics would not have
progressed very far. Fortunately, two-valued truth functions do
not constrain us to the assertion that an object is hot or cold,
and binary logic does not impose upon us such a poor approxi-
mation of physical reality (or our perceptions of that reality, to
use modernist language). To say how hot an object is, we must
refine our language to allow sentences Tj of the form "The ob-
ject has temperature j." Each of these sentences is either true
or false but not both. I can detect no advantage over the con-
ventional and fruitful rule that a sentence cannot be simultane-
ously true and false in a new logic that would assign a true
value to the compound proposition T1 and not -TI.
Spann may not disagree with this. At one point he suggests
that the new logic may reserve a domain for the old logic, 10 7
and he could say that I have uncovered a part of this domain. I
merely point out, however, that criticism of binary logic as inca-
pable of handling multivalued functions and multidimensional,
multivalued properties does not constitute a substantial argu-
ment for the new logic. Rather, it reflects mesmerization with
the word binary.
103. Spann, supra note 2, at 712.
104. Id. at 713.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 695, 700, 710, 713.
107. I at 712.
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Furthermore, binary logic can accommodate the private-
public distinction that troubles Spann. We do not need a new
logic "to allow something to be both public and private at the
same time.' 0 8 We could define the property P of privacy on a
scale ranging from zero (completely public) to one hundred
(completely private) and use a series of numerically indexed
sentences to describe the degree of privacy. As in the tempera-
ture example, each sentence remains either true or false but
not both.
Legal rules reflect a binary feature arising from the binary
nature of many legal proceedings. Either the government al-
lows the individual to undertake an activity without penalty or
it does not. A new logic, allowing statements like "the action is
private and the action is not private" to be true (partly true, or
whatever) still would have to confront this fact. Perhaps we
could devise a new system of outcomes to legal disputes, but
Spann does not relate this idea to his call for a new logic. 0 9
IV. THE END OF THE ROAD
Perhaps these criticisms would not matter to Spann. He
concludes that "when we ultimately do effect our escape to a
post-binary logical paradigm, we cannot expect the route to be
paved with traditional logical appeal." 110 I have argued, how-
ever, that even the pragmatic justifications that he adduces
have little appeal. Conceding that technical arguments about
rules and terms frequently entangle lawyers and courts, and
recognizing that many rules are open-textured and difficult to
apply, I find no obvious reason to think that the intuitionist,
storytelling approach would be superior to a sincere effort to
induce and apply general rules to individual cases.
I fear that my reluctance to experience the new percep-
tions and the leap into conceptual hyperspace"l ' makes me part
108. Spann, supra note 2, at 713 n.95.
109. I also should register disagreement with Spann's related claim that "it
is possible to uncover internal contradictions and logical inconsistencies in al-
most any formulation of a binary premise." Id. at 713. To establish this claim,
he must exhibit a method or procedure for uncovering such contradictions.
From the standpoint of logic, the deconstructionist style is not such a method.
Indeed, for the reasons stated in the early parts of this Article, the "logical di-
lemmas generated in Part I," id., are resolvable within standard logic. Spann's
assertions notwithstanding, he has not shown that the method of generating
the dilemmas vitiates reformulations that avoid or dispose of the dilemmas.
110. Id. at 714.
111. Id. at 722.
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of a regressive force.-1 But my intransigence should not dis-
tress a believer in Secret Rights. After all, is it not written that
When the best student hears about the way
He practices it assiduously;
When the average student hears about the way
It seems to him one moment there and gone the next;
When the worst student hears about the way
He laughs out loud.
If he did not laugh
It would be unworthy of being the way.
11 3
Like Taoism, Secret Rights has mystical, rather than logical,
allure.
112. Spann, supra note 2, at 720.
113. LAo Tzu, TAO TE CHING 102 (E. Rieu trans. 1963). In quoting from the
Lao Tzu, I am calling attention to the link between Secret Rights and the fun-
damental Taoist premise that:
The way that can be told
Is not the constant way;
The name that can be named
Is not the constant name.
Id. at 57.
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